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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the stock market reacts differently to the issuance of fixed-rate Sukuk 
as compared to fixed-rate conventional bonds and hence, if there is a difference in the shareholder 
wealth effect of these two types of issuances. We use Malaysian publicly listed non-financial firms, 
event study methodology, market model and FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Index on fourteen different 
event windows of which five are symmetric and nine are asymmetric. Our sample is divided into three 
subsamples: overall period (2000-2015), pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and post-crisis period (2010-
2015). Our analysis indicates only insignificant difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to 
fixed-rate Sukuk- and to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances for the overall period and pre-crisis 
period. However, and importantly, we find a highly significant difference in the Malaysian stock 
market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk compared to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances after the 
global financial crisis. Such evidence is confirmed when using a wide range of robustness checks 
including four different market indices and both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, Islamic finance has witnessed a remarkably broad expansion, including a 
notable widening of operations of Islamic banks and extensive issuance of investment certificates that 
comply with Islamic law (Sharia). Today, Islamic finance has grown from its former ‘niche’ product 
status and expanded to over 60 countries. With total assets in Islamic banking reportedly exceeding 
$1.3 trillion, Islamic mutual funds are estimated to register about $500 billion, and the issuance of 
Islamic sovereign and corporate bonds, or Sukuk, totalled $94 billion in 2013 (Sherif and Shaairi, 
2013).  
The emergence of the Islamic financial services industry, heavily concentrated in the Middle East and 
Asia, represents an effort to develop an independent financial system next to the predominant one, and 
hence offers significant further options for risk diversification. Since its inception, the international 
Islamic finance industry has expanded and grown greatly. For example, the global Islamic finance 
assets are estimated to be worth USD 1.87 trillion as of 1H 2014. Much of this considerable growth in 
assets has been fuelled by Sukuk- or Islamic bond market, which have a similar pattern of structure to 
conventional bonds, but permit corporate issuers to raise funds in capital markets that comply with 
Sharia principles (IFSB, 2015). Sukuk is an Arabic word, which is a plural form of Sakk, which 
means certificate (McMillen, 2007). Sukuk are investment certificates needed to finance new 
activities where profits and loss are shared between the Sukuk issuer and the Sukuk holder, instead of 
the more conventional charging or paying a pre-agreed interest rate. Sukuk should satisfy three 
criteria to comply with Islamic law: (i) “the certificates must represent ownership in tangible assets, 
usufruct or services of revenue-generating firms; (ii) payments to investors should come from after-
tax profits; and (iii) the value paid at maturity should reflect the current market price of the underlying 
asset not the original amount invested“ (Godlewski et al., 2013, pp. 745-746). 
One further Sukuk-related argument that has recently been given much attention is related to the 
global financial crisis of 2007/08, which intensified the requirement for risk diversification within the 
financial system. From the time when the global financial crisis hit world economies, risk aversion 
has been at the centre of attention for investors. Consequently, Sukuk have experienced much 
prevalence where demand has constantly exceeded supply, particularly with issuances that are backed 
by robust balance sheets. The Sukuk market is by far the fastest growing segment of the overall 
Islamic finance industry, even though it has entered the market only relatively recently, in the mid-
1990s. As shown in Figure 1, the global Sukuk outstanding volume has grown considerably, with a 
compound annual growth rate of 20.8 % between 2008 and 2013 and a total amount of USD 294.7 
billion in volume as of 3Q 2014. The Sukuk market has been driven by an intensified interest among 
several sovereign and corporate issuers, in tapping into the Sharia compliant finance liquidity pools, 
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notably after the global financial crisis. As shown in Figure 2, the average annual Sukuk issuances 
have exceeded the USD 100 billion milestone in each of the last three years.  
This growing trend has also been propelled by several new markets such as the United Kingdom 
(£200 million issuance), Luxembourg (€200 million issuance) and Hong Kong (USD 1 billion 
issuance) (IFSB, 2015).      
INSERT Figure 1 here 
INSERT Figure 2 here 
Nevertheless, despite the importance of Sukuk as one of the most significant investment choices 
confronting Islamic - predominant countries worldwide, evidence against their reliability has 
accumulated. For example, the criticism of Sheikh Mohammed Taqi Usmani (2007), president of the 
AAOIFI, that current practices of Sukuk issuances replicate the structure of conventional bonds with 
regard to their lack of ownership, their right to a fixed return, and their guarantee of repayment of the 
principal amount; has fuelled the debate regarding the compliance of Sukuk with the principles of 
Sharia. Consequently, this raises the question whether Sukuk are truly different from conventional 
bonds and do indeed provide an alternative instrument of financing that may complement them. In 
addition to such ethical critiques, other more practical critiques, such as those from Miller et al. 
(2007), Wilson (2008), Chin and Abdullah (2012), and Rahim and Ahmad (2014) claim that Sukuk 
instruments are generally structured along Western rules of securitization and do not represent 
promising tools for financial innovation. However, in contrast to these critiques, Cakir and Raei 
(2007), Alam et al. (2013) and Azmat et al.(2014) take an opposing view on the similarity of Sukuk 
and conventional bonds. Their counterargument is that Sukuk are distinct from conventional bonds, 
since they provide diversification benefits in terms of risk-reduction when added to a portfolio of 
fixed income securities. Similarly, Ramasamy et al. (2011) found that Sukuk seem to be less risky and 
offer less yield as compared to conventional bonds. Moreover, if such counterarguments are valid, 
then they would also underline the fact that ethically, Sukuk were indeed close to Sharia law.  
Our study goes to the heart of the ongoing debate on Sukuk. Although we leave aside theoretical and 
structural comparisons, we consider whether in fact Sukuk simply mirror conventional bonds, or are a 
promising alternative to them. In essence, we ask whether the stock market reacts differently to the 
issuance of fixed-rate Sukuk as compared to fixed-rate conventional bonds and hence, if there is a 
difference in the shareholder wealth effect of these two types of issuances. Our study contributes to 
the seemingly contradictory impacts of Sukuk on the wealth effect in several ways. First, our study 
sheds light on the novel expansion of Sukuk, adding to a fairly thin research base; very few studies 
examine the shareholder wealth effect of Sukuk and the difference between conventional bond and 
Sukuk issuances. To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies compare the shareholder wealth 
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effects of Sukuk- and conventional bond issuance over a long time period. Furthermore, our study 
complements itself from the abovementioned few studies by focusing on the difference between 
fixed-rate Sukuk and fixed-rate conventional bond issuances. Second, our study contributes to the 
recent debate on the compliance of Sukuk with the principles of Sharia. Finally, the findings of our 
study are useful to portfolio managers, banks and other financial institutions and individual investors, 
as they indirectly examine whether Sukuk represent an alternative source of financing.   
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 is a brief literature review. Section 3 
provides details of the data, models and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and 
section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Sukuk Definition and Structure 
Sukuk is an Arabic word, which is a plural form of Sakk, meaning Islamic financial certificate” or 
“order of payment”, similar to a bond in Western finance, but one that complies with Sharia law 
(McMillen, 2007). The Council of the Islamic Fiqh in 1988 defined Sukuk as “investment instruments 
which allocate the capital (mudaraba) by floating certificates, as an evidence of capital ownership, on 
the basis of shares of equal value, registered in the name of the owner, as joint owners of shares in the 
venture capital or whatever shape it may take’ each one’s share therein.” (Saeed and Salah, 2014, p. 
46). 
Recently, from an Islamic perspective, Sukuk have been considered to consist of asset monetization. 
In other words, securitization, or tawreeq, which is a process whereby the underlying assets’ 
ownership is transferred to a large number of investors. Sukuk are certificates of equal redeemable 
value representing an undivided share in the ownership of tangible assets of particular projects or 
specific investment activities and services (Salah, 2014). Also, the ‘Investment Sukuk’ of May 2003 
became effective on January 1st 2004. This was the results of the Sharia Standard No., 17, pp. 61-62 
issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). A 
definition of Sukuk is given in section 2 of this Sharia Standard as “certificates of equal value 
representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the 
ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment activity …”.  
The word Sukuk, representing Islamic securities, is often translated as “Islamic bonds”. However, the 
term “Islamic bonds” does not completely capture the essence of Sukuk. This is because the term 
“Islamic bonds” may indicate that Sukuk have both equity and debt features. However, there are 
different types of Sukuk structures depending on the nature of the underlying asset (Saeed and Salah, 
2014). According to Salah (2014), Sukuk structures can be categorised into three basic types based on 
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the Islamic finance contract applied in the relevant Sukuk transaction: Sukuk al-musharaka (equity-
based), Sukuk al-murabaha (sale-based) and Sukuk al-ijarah (lease-based).1 Equity-based Sukuk were 
established in the early 1980s, and identified as certificates issued with the goal of using the funds 
deposited to create a novel project, develop an established project or finance a business activity by 
virtue of one of the partnership contracts such as musharaka, mudarabah and wakalah. It is worth 
noting that for this kind of Sukuk the profit-and loss-sharing is maintained until maturity, and also that 
during this period, these Sukuk are tradable in secondary markets. The second type of Sukuk is sale-
based Sukuk, which are issued based on sale contracts like murabaha, salam or istisna. For example, 
the Sukuk al-murabaha starts with an originator seeking to finance the acquisition of a determined 
tangible property from a third-party seller. Admittedly, the tangible property must be for halal 
motives (consent Islamic law). In other words the tangible property must be unrelated to unethical 
industries such as gambling, prostitution, drugs, alcohol, and the pornography industry. The third type 
of Sukuk, which is a lease-based Sukuk (al-Ijarah), is seen as the most popular Sukuk, due to the fact 
that they provide fixed returns to Sukuk holders (as the Sukuk al-murabaha) as well as the fact that 
they are tradable in secondary markets (as the Sukuk al-musharaka). These two aforementioned 
elements make lease-based Sukuk both a viable alternative to conventional bonds and attractive for 
investors seeking for Sharia-compliant fixed income securities. The contract of ijarah establishes the 
foundation of lease-based Sukuk. Tangible property, which is entitled for leasing, such as aircraft, 
buildings, land, vehicles or equipment, are often used as the underlying property of the Sukuk 
transaction.2 
2.1.1. Development of the Sukuk Industry  
The recognition and trading of Sukuk by Muslim communities in the early years of Sukuk was in the 
forms of papers that reflected the financial obligations developed from trade and other forms of key 
commercial activities.  In addition, Sukuk were used to present written instruments of credit and 
theoretical legal works in genizah records. For example, the Cairo genizah records include key 
documents that represent the existence of Sakk in the 12th century CE. At times, Sukuk were referred 
to as money orders, which is remarkably similar in form to current contemporary cheques. These 
forms of Sukuk settled and stated the whole amount to be paid, as well as the name of the issuer, the 
order, and the date.  
Throughout the transitional or middle age, a Sakk was a registered vow, or oath, to repay for goods 
when they were delivered. Indeed, it was adopted to avoid money having to be transported across 
unsecured forms of assets. Consequently, Sukuk were traded across several countries and spread 
                                                            
1 While Sukuk al-ijarah is mostly adopted when Sukuk relate to a partial ownership of an asset, Sukuk murabaha, Sukuk al-istisna, Sukuk al-musharaka and 
Sukuk al-istithmar are related to partial ownership in debt, project, business and investment respectively. 
2 According to Article 3 AAOIFI SS 17, there are five different forms of lease-based Sukuk: “(1) Sukuk alijarah that represent ownership in a (leased) tangible 
property; and Sukuk manfaa-ijarah, which represent the right of using the original tangible property and divided into (2) Sukuk associated with the right of 
using current tangible property; (3) those associated with the right of using future tangible property; (4) Sukuk related to services of a specified party; and (5) 
those associated with identified future services“(Salah, 2014, p. 68). 
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throughout the globe. For example, the Jewish traders and investors who been travelling to the 
predominantly Muslims countries transported the term Sakk to Europe. In addition, the trade and 
transport of these Sukuk has been functioning as a source of inspiration for the contemporary cheque. 
Despite the fact that the cheque has a British background, the contemporary Western word “cheque” 
appears to have been established from the Arabic word sakk (Saeed and Salah, 2014). In 1990, Shell 
MDS issued one of the very first Sukuk in Malaysia. The subsequent period was characterised by an 
inactive trading of Sukuk until the beginning of the 21st century. Over the first decade of the 21st 
century the market witnessed several Sukuk issuances in different forms and structures. Since 2001, a 
greater number of entities such as government and corporations have started issuing Sukuk and hence 
establishing the Sukuk market (Saeed and Salah, 2014).  
Overall therefore, the global Sukuk market has boomed from 2001 to 2013, arguably as a result of 
political and economic improvements across the country. During this time, the Sukuk industry grew 
by 27.8%, from US$14.8 billion in 2001, to US$281.3 billion in 2013. According to Godlewski et al., 
(2011) Malaysia dominates the Sukuk market, accounting for approximately 75% of total issues, and 
has remained the largest Sukuk market. Malaysia has registered 58.1% of the total outstanding Sukuk 
followed by the Middle East, which represents an approximate 30% of the total investments in Sukuk 
worldwide.  Other emerging East Asian markets (excluding Malaysia) have registered 6%. While 
Malaysia continues to dominate the local currency (LCY) - Sukuk market, the markets placed in the 
Middle East are the most active issuers of foreign currency (FCY) - Sukuk (AAOIFI; Salah 2014; 
Godlewski, 2011). 
Recently, the global financial crisis has brought the Islamic financial services and products, in 
particular Sukuk, into the spotlight for a number of western countries. Regulatory proposals in the 
aftermath of the crisis have singled out the Sukuk market as one of their main targets. For example, 
according to the UK's foreign office minister for Middle East, London is bidding to become a leading 
centre for Sharia-compliant finance, retaining its role and setting its sights on becoming the world 
centre for the Islamic finance and Sukuk industry. The sovereign Sukuk market, which makes up only 
0.1pc of global financial assets, is predicted to expand by 20pc a year, according to Robert Gray, 
chairman of debt finance at HSBC (Miller et al., 2007). Recent UK legislation has been designed to 
treat Sukuk as conventional bonds by providing tax treatments for Sukuk equivalent to those for 
similar financial products. Recently, we have observed two issues signalling a broadening in the 
acknowledgment and significant recognition of Sukuk outside the Islamic world (Godlewski, 2013).  
The first issue was to raise money for general corporate and balance sheet purposes by issuing US-
based GE Capital’s 5-year $500 million Sukuk. The second issue was to increase funding for 
development activities in emerging markets, including the MENA region, by issuing oversubscribed 
5-year Aaa-rated $100 million Sukuk of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was 
7 | P a g e  
   
jointly arranged by HSBC, Dubai Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain. This indeed 
signalled and demonstrated that the World Bank, one of the leading international institutions, 
acknowledged the importance of Sukuk as a financing tool (Godlewski, 2011).  
2.1.2. Are Sukuk that different from conventional bonds? 
Overall, Sukuk are perceived as a Sharia-compliant bond, which symbolize and identify ownership of 
an asset or its usufruct, and thus represent an ownership claim rather than cash flow claim. Whereas 
Sukuk are investment certificates consisting of ownership claims in a pool of assets, conventional 
bonds proceed over interest bearing securities (Salah, 2014). Table 1 below shows the differences 
between Sukuk and conventional bonds.3 
INSERT Table 1 here 
2.2 Literature Review 
Significantly, there has been a long running debate on the issuance effects of different types of 
conventional bond offerings on shareholder wealth. For example, Eckbo (1986) investigated the stock 
market valuation effect of leverage-increasing corporate debt issues, encompassing both convertible 
and non-convertible debt. Eckbo (1986) found that straight bond offerings are associated with 
insignificantly non-positive effects on the firm’s share price. In contrast, convertible bond offerings 
and public utility mortgage bond have a significant negative impact on the corresponding firms share 
price.  
Similarly, Stephen and Ward (1996) examine the stock price reaction to the announcement of high-
yield straight bond issues. Using a sample of 164 bond issues, they demonstrated that the AARs are 
statistically not significantly different from zero on day +2. In addition, they indicated that the stock 
market does not react differently for the high-yield bond issues that default, as compared to those that 
do not default. Further, they investigated the impact of bond characteristics on the announcement-
induced ARs and suggest that announcement-period ARs are neither positively nor negatively related 
to issue year, bond rating, issue size, underwriter, takeover activity or past high-yield debt issue 
experience. This finding contradicts the models developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and 
Rock (1985), Krasker (1986) and Jensen (1986), who find a negative stock price effect of bond issues. 
However, the findings of Stephen and Ward indicate no statistically significant relation between the 
announcement of high-yield straight bonds and the corresponding share price.  
In the same vein, using 937 straight bonds over the period 1983 to 1993, Howton et. al (1998) 
attempted to test Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow statement on straight bond issues and their results 
                                                            
3 It was usually referring to the Islamic equivalent of bonds as Sukuk, which differ remarkably from conventional bonds in that the Sukuk 
provides the investor with a share of an asset as well as the corresponding cash flows and risk. Consequently, ethical bonds or Sukuk adhere 
to Islamic laws or Sharia principles, which prohibit the payment of interest. 
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indicated that the market reacts significantly negatively to the issuance of straight bonds. In addition, 
they found that the market’s reaction to straight bond announcements is directly associated with the 
issuing company’s level of free cash flow prior to the bond issue, while the issuing company’s 
investment opportunities, as proxied by the marginal q, are inversely related. 
In a related study, using 260 public bond offerings created by the non-U.S. companies in the U.S. 
bond market, Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) examined the costs, the shareholder wealth effects 
and the determinants of international fund raising. They found evidence to support the argument that 
the issue of Yankee bond offerings creates a significantly positive wealth effect for the issuing 
company’s shareholders, and that AARs are found to be the highest for the first-time Yankee bond 
seller. 
In another key study, Martel and Padron (2006) investigated the informative content of straight bond 
offering announcements on the Spanish stock market for a sample of 67 straight bonds covering the 
period of 1989-1998. They examined the stock price reaction to both the abovementioned 
announcements as well as the substitution effect existing between debt and dividends. They reported a 
significantly positive wealth effect for companies associated with relatively low dividend payouts 
following straight debt issue announcements. However, they found that the Spanish market does not 
react to the abovementioned announcements when these are made by high dividend payout 
companies.  
Furthermore, Suchard and Singh (2006) found that among non-equity announcement offerings, the 
stock market reacts most negatively to the announcement of convertible debt issues, followed by 
convertible preference shares. In comparison, the announcement-period ARs of both straight debt and 
preference share issues are, in general, insignificantly different from zero.  
In addition, Shao et al. (2007) investigated the importance of investment opportunities and free cash 
flow as an explanatory variable in the origin of the stock valuation effects of secured debt issues. They 
found an insignificant positive relationship between a company’s investment opportunities and its 
share price reaction to announcements of secured debt offerings, implying that secured debt, as a 
financing tool, is more beneficial to firms that have relatively high growth opportunities.  
In another recent study, Chin and Abdullah (2012) adopted an event study methodology as well as a 
multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of bonds on the issuing firms’ stock market 
behaviour. Using 100 bond issue announcements made by publicly listed non-financial companies in 
Malaysia over the period of 2000 to 2007, they reported a significant increase in the stock returns of 
the corporate bond issuers during the event windows [-10,-1] and [+1, +10], implying that an increase 
in the level of debt has a positive impact on stock prices. For the multiple regression analysis, they 
found insignificant impact of the following firm characteristics on the cumulative abnormal return 
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(CAR): profitability, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, company size and managerial ownership. 
Interestingly, they provide evidence supporting the existence of a signalling effect of corporate bond 
issuance announcements, which is not determined by company characteristics.  
Another strand of recent literature has placed emphasis on the impact of Sukuk Issuance on 
shareholder wealth. Although Sukuk have witnessed a wide expansion in Islamic finance in recent 
years, there are only a handful of studies that have investigated its effect on shareholder wealth. One 
example is the study by Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011), who used a sample of 45 Islamic 
debt announcements made by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange for the period 
of 2005-2008. They investigated the information contents of Islamic private debt issues reflected in 
stock prices. They found that on average, companies experience negative AAR from day -2 to day 2, 
and negative CAAR during the event windows [-1,1], [-1,0] and [0,+1]. However, the t-statistics are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance for AAR one-day prior to the announcement. 
This implies that the information about Islamic debt offerings appears to leak out to the public ahead 
of the announcement. Overall, they claimed that the announcement of Islamic private debt offerings 
has a negative impact on the corresponding stock price, and also that Islamic bonds have more equity-
like features than bond-like features.  
Similarly, Ahmad and Rusgianto (2013) examined the information content of post-crisis Islamic bond 
announcements in Malaysia over the period of 2009-2010. Using event study methodology and the 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (FBMKLCI) as a proxy for market return, they investigated CAARs 
using three event windows [0, 0], [-1, +1] and [-2, +2]. Their findings indicated that the shareholder 
wealth effect of post-crisis Islamic bond announcements is positive across all event windows. 
However, the t-statistics were not statistically significant, implying that shareholders are indifferent to 
post-crisis Sukuk announcements. This finding suggests that Sukuk, being perceived neither as debt 
nor as equity within the investor universe, reflect the economic power of the firm and real economic 
activities. In addition, Ahmad and Rusgianto highly recommended future research to test for 
asymmetric responses to different types of Sukuk issues. 
Recently, the global financial crisis has brought Sukuk into the spotlight. For example, Rahim and 
Ahmad (2014), in Malaysia, investigated whether various announcements of Sukuk issues conveyed 
any information relevant for pricing the stocks in the period of 2004 to 2011. They argued that the 
stock market reacted significantly positively to Sukuk issue announcements prior to the crisis, but 
significantly negatively during and after the crisis. In the same line, Ahmad and Rahim (2014) 
investigated whether the stock market reacts differently to the issuance of Sukuk, using sectoral 
issuance for the period of 2004-2011. The three sectors considered were services, construction and 
industrial products. They suggested that the market response to service sector announcements in 
asymmetric events tends to be significantly positive. Further, they demonstrated that the service sector 
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has experienced a growth in issuances and even has the highest number of issuances in the post-crisis 
period, implying that Sukuk issuers are dominated by the services sector due to these sectors having a 
higher positive impact on shareholder wealth.  
Elsewhere, Elian and Young-Taft (2014) examined the effect of corporate Sukuk offering 
announcements on stock returns for four Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) exchanges, namely 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, covering the period of 2004-2012. Their 
findings suggest the absence of significantly positive ARs around the announcement period. In 
contrast, the Sukuk offering announcement was found to have a negative impact on shareholder 
wealth by estimating the AAR one-day before the announcement. However, CAAR p-values for both 
the z-test and t-test show insignificant findings for both symmetric and asymmetric event windows 
before and after the announcement dates. This implies that there is no wealth effect of Islamic bond 
offering announcements on the GCC stock markets. Elian and Young-Taft attributed this to the smaller 
investor base for Sukuk in the GCC region, implying lower cost advantages which in turn lead to 
higher cost of capital.  
Similarly, based on a sample of 45 companies in Malaysia for the period 2009-2011, Rahim and 
Ahmad (2015) investigated whether the stock market reacts asymmetrically to the issuance of Sukuk 
after the recent 2008 global financial crisis, by estimating CAARs for both symmetric and asymmetric 
events. They found significantly positive symmetric and asymmetric market reactions surrounding the 
actual issue date of Sukuk. According to Rahim and Ahmad (2015) these findings are attributable to 
the following reasons: first, the market is able to differentiate news and second, market participants 
are confident that the issue of Islamic debt offerings will lead to an increase in shareholder wealth. 
The latter is because Sukuk, being neither debt nor equity, are true to the rules of Islamic economics, 
whereby the issuance is associated with the economic strength of the corporation and real economic 
activities.  
One further argument that has recently been given much attention is related to the differences between 
conventional bonds and Sukuk in terms of stock market perspective. There is less empirical evidence 
on the differences between conventional bonds and Sukuk issuances with regard to stock market 
reactions and shareholder wealth effects. For example, Ashhari et al. (2009) analysed the impact of 
Sukuk and conventional bonds announcements on the corresponding stock prices made by listed firms 
on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange covering the period 2001-2006. Using event study 
methodology with beta refinement using Blume’s method, their results showed that on average the 
Malaysian stock market reacts positively to the announcement of Sukuk, which is in contrast with the 
announcement of conventional bonds.  
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In another study, Ibrahim and Minai (2009) examined the shareholder wealth effect of Sukuk 
announcements and their determinants. They found that Malaysian stockholders react significantly 
positively during the event windows [-3, 3] and [-3, 0] following the announcement of Sukuk issue 
over the period 2000-2006. This implies that the offering of Sukuk by Malaysian firms benefits its 
corresponding stockholders through wealth increase. Conversely, no significant ARs are reported for 
the announcement of conventional bond issuance. In addition, Ibrahim and Minai (2009) found that 
the wealth generated from Sukuk issue announcement is higher than that of conventional issuances. 
This finding is attributable to the cost advantages associated with a lower cost of capital of Islamic 
debt securities as compared to conventional debt securities. For the cross-sectional regression analysis 
adopted to explain the sources of wealth creation in the case of Sukuk announcements, they found that 
the issuer’s investment opportunity is statistically positively related to the CAR, while firm size, issue 
size and SC approval status adversely influence the cumulative abnormal return CAR. In consistency 
with conventional bonds, they argue that their finding of positive market reaction is not linked to the 
investor’s preference for Sharia compliant activities.  
Similarly, Godlweski et al. (2013) used event study methodology and market model to examine the 
differences in CAARs and CASARs between Sukuk and conventional bond events for Malaysian 
listed companies over the period of 2002-2009. Overall, their findings indicate that shareholders are 
indifferent to announcements of conventional bond issuance, but that they react significantly 
negatively to announcements of Sukuk issuance. Godlweski et al. (2013) attribute this finding to the 
surplus demand of Islamic debt offerings from Islamic banks, as well as to an adverse selection 
mechanism that claims that Sukuk are issued mostly by lower-quality debtor firms. In another study, 
Alam et al. (2013) investigated the comparative wealth effect of the announcement of conventional 
bonds and Sukuk as well as their determinants. They used 87 conventional bonds and 79 Sukuks 
during the period of 2004 to 2012 in six developed Islamic financial markets, namely Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The overall study period is further 
divided into three sub-samples: 2004-2006 (pre-crisis period); 2007-2009 (during crisis period) and 
2010-2012 (post-crisis period). The stock market reaction was found to be significantly negative in 
response to the announcement of Sukuk during the global financial crisis period, while the stock 
market response was significantly positive to Sukuk issuances in the post-crisis period. With regard to 
conventional bond announcements, the stock market reaction was found to be significantly negative 
during the global financial crisis. However, there was a lack of significant market reaction to both 
conventional bond and Sukuk announcements over a longer time period.   
2.3. Hypotheses Developments 
Previous studies on the shareholder wealth effects of conventional bond issuance offer mixed 
evidence in different markets. For example, Eckbo (1986), Stephen and Ward (1996), and Suchard 
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and Singh (2006) all concluded that there is no significant wealth effect derived from the 
announcement of conventional bond issuance. These findings contradict the theories developed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), Krasker (1986) and Jensen (1986), who assume a 
negative stock price effect of bond issues. In agreement with the theory, however, Howton et al. 
(1998) reported a negative and significant stock market reaction to the announcement of straight debt 
issues. In contrast, Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002), Martel and Padron (2006) and Chin and 
Abdullah (2012) found evidence that the issuance of new debt has a significantly positive impact on 
the issuing firms’ stock prices. These findings are further supported by the theories of Miller and 
Modigliani (1963), Ross (1977), and Leland and Pyle (1977). 
With regard to Sukuk issuance, there is not much evidence on the effect of Sukuk issuance over a 
longer time frame, and the existing evidence is conflicting and inconclusive. For example, Elian and 
Young-Taft (2014) found that the issue of Sukuk has insignificant impact on the stock market. 
Whereas Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011) as well as Godlweski et al. (2013) report 
significantly negative results, Ahmad and Rahim (2014) reported significantly positive results.  To the 
best of our knowledge, none of these previous studies provide empirical evidence on the difference 
between conventional bond and Sukuk issuances over a longer time frame, thereby covering both the 
pre-crisis and the post-crisis period. It is worth noting that Godlewski et al. (2013) conclude that the 
stock market reacts differently to the issuance of Sukuk as compared to conventional bonds in the 
short time frame. However, the main argument brought forward in the present study, is that fixed-rate 
Sukuk are not Sharia-compliant. Based on the arguments provided above, we favor the argument that 
there are no differences between Sukuk and conventional bond issuances. Hence, the first hypothesis 
(H1) can be stated as follows: 
H1: There is no significant difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- as 
compared to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances during the period 2000 through 2015. 
Very few studies have investigated the difference in stock market reaction to Sukuk- and to 
conventional bond issuances in the pre-crisis period. In one example, Ibrahim and Minai (2009) 
suggest that the stock market reacts differently to the issuance of Sukuk as compared to conventional 
bonds.  While there is no significant market reaction to the issuance of conventional bonds, there is a 
significantly positive stock market reaction to Sukuk issuances during the pre-crisis period. Similarly, 
Godlweski et al. (2013) found a significant difference of CAARs between Sukuk and conventional 
bond issuances, implying that stock markets react differently to issuances of both securities.  
Additionally, Ashhari et al. (2009) findings show that, on average, the Malaysian stock market reacts 
positively to Sukuk announcements, while it remains indifferent to the announcement of conventional 
bonds during the pre-crisis period. In the same vein, Alam et al. (2013) suggest the absence of any 
significant market response to both Sukuk and conventional bond announcements during the pre-crisis 
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period. Indeed, resonant of this, the main argument in our study is that fixed-rate Sukuk have more 
bond-like features rather than being neither debt nor equity. Based on the above discussion, the second 
hypothesis (H2) is stated as follows: 
H2: There is no significant difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- as 
compared to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances before the global financial crisis (2000-2007). 
To date, very little research has been undertaken with regard to the difference in shareholder wealth 
effect of post-crisis Sukuk- and conventional bond issuances. For example, Alam et al. (2013) report 
that the issuance of Sukuk during the post-crisis period is associated with an increase in shareholder 
stock return, whereas the issuance of conventional bonds has no significant impact on the stock 
market. Further, Rahim and Ahmad (2015) report that the issuance of Sukuk during the post-crisis 
period is associated with an increase in shareholder’s stock return. Given the fact that recent studies 
provide evidence on the presence of a significant positive shareholder wealth effect regarding the 
issuance of Sukuk and no significant wealth effect on conventional bond issuance for the post-crisis 
period, our next testable hypothesis (H3) is formulated as follows: 
H3: There is a significant difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk as 
compared to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances after the global financial crisis (2010-2015). 
3. Data and Research Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The data in this study spans the period January 2000 - May 2015. The data on Sukuk and conventional 
bond issuances was obtained from the Thomson ONE Banker database.4 A sample of 205 
conventional bond issuances, and of 255 Sukuk issuances was obtained. Data on the characteristics of 
both issuances including the coupon rate, the issue price, the maturity and the macro description were 
also collected from Thomson ONE Banker database.  All variable amounts were only available in 
millions of US Dollars, with the exception of coupons (percent), issue prices (percent) and maturities 
(years). In order to avoid a currency effect, all the requested variables for the multivariate analysis 
were converted and presented in the Malaysian Ringit from DataStream. The data on closing stock 
prices (Total Return Index5 RI) of the companies that issued Sukuk or conventional bonds and data on 
chosen market indices were obtained from the DataStream. We used RI to obtain a more precise 
measurement because unadjusted closing share prices did not account for “stock split”, “dividend 
                                                            
4 Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), De Jong et al. (2008) and De Miguel and Pindado (2001), we exclude the financial sector, including 
banks and insurance companies due to the different accounting categories and rules used in these companies. 
5RI shows a theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase 
additional units of an equity or unit trust as the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. 
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pay”, “re-purchase” and “right issue”.6 The final sample comprised 122 Sukuk- and 87 conventional 
bond issuances, which was due to stock price data unavailability for a time span sufficiently long 
enough before the issue date and after an elimination of the contamination of other corporate events 
that could also have influenced the CAR and caused multiple issue problems. Further, we divided our 
sample into three subsamples: overall period, pre-crisis period and post-crisis period. Table 2 presents 
the main variables used in our study.   
 
INSERT Table 2 here 
 
3.2. Research Methodology 
In order to be consistent with earlier studies in this area, Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event 
study methodology was adopted to calculate the abnormal returns.7 The employment of an event study 
is considered highly reasonable because, given that the capital market is a “semi-strong form 
efficient”, the stock prices will instantaneously reflect the impacts of the event (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Thus, the economic effect of certain events can be estimated over a shorter time period as compared to 
alternative methodologies such as the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach and the 
calendar time (CTIME) approach, which focus on identifying whether certain events influence stock 
prices over longer time periods, i.e. several months or even years (Dutta, 2014).8 Short-term event 
studies can be conducted using all kinds of normal return models such as the constant-mean return 
model, the CAPM, multi-factor models such as the Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart (1997) 
models, as well as by matched portfolios, as proposed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). This study 
ruled out multi-factor models for two reasons. First, the recent findings obtained by Athern (2009) 
suggest that findings are only vaguely sensitive to the kind of identifications adopted to calculate 
returns, and that simple models are more appropriate. Second, the execution of multi-factor models 
demands information on firm characteristics, which is only obtainable in a limited scope. Following 
the literature9, a market model approach that assumed a constant and a linear relation between 
individual stock returns and the return on the market index was adopted: 
  Ri,τ =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖  𝑅𝑚,𝜏 +  𝜀𝑖,𝜏 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝜏] = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝐴𝑅 [𝜀𝑖,𝜏] =  𝜎𝜀𝑖
2                            (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝜏 is the return on the stock price of issuer 𝑖 on day 𝜏, 𝑅𝑚,𝜏 the stock market return on day 𝜏, 
𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 are the model parameters to be estimated over a chosen estimation window and 𝜀𝑖,𝜏 is the 
                                                            
6 We use daily data cos it lowers the chance of other corporate news being included in the effect (Martel and Padron, 2006). Similarly, 
Kothari and Warner (2006) indicate that the use of daily, rather than monthly data allows a more accurate measurement of abnormal returns 
as well as more instructive studies of event effects. 
7 For more details on event study methodology and issue dates see for example Kapoor and Pope (1997) and Chen et al. (2005). 
8Unlike in most previous studies, the issue date is used instead of the announcement date. According to Thomson ONE Banker, the issue 
date is defined as the pricing date of the issue. 
9 See, for instance, Ashhari et al. (2009), Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011) and Rahim and Ahmad (2014). 
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error term.  
The raw return of a stock is identified as: 
                   𝑅𝜏 =  
𝑃(𝜏) −  𝑃(𝜏−1)
𝑃(𝜏−1)
                                                                                                 (2)       
where 𝑅𝜏 is the return at time 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏) is the daily closing stock price (RI) at time 𝜏 and 𝑃(𝑖,𝜏−1) is the 
daily closing stock price at time 𝜏 − 1.  
The five market indices used as a proxy for market returns were the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS10; 
the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI11; the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 10012; the FTSE Malaysia13 and TR 
Malaysia L14. The benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (AR) of stock i is the difference between daily 
raw return (𝑅𝑖,𝜏) and the expected return on day τ. Therefore,   𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 is identified using ordinary OLS 
regressions and an estimation window ranging from 181 days to 61 days prior to the event date as: 
ARi,τ =  Ri,τ − E (Ri,τ|Ωi,τ)                                                                                   (3) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝜏 is the actual return on the stock price of issuer 𝑖 on day 𝜏, whereas 𝐸 (𝑅𝑖,𝜏|Ω𝑖,𝜏) is the 
expected return on day 𝜏 that is unconditional on the event, but conditional on a separate information 
set.15 
The CAR is consequently calculated using the following formula: 
  CARi (τ1,τ2) =  ∑ ARi,t
τ2
t=τ1
                                                                                             (4) 
where τ1and τ2 are the lower and upper bounds of an event window respectively.  
Following MacKinlay (1997), the CARs are aggregated over time and across stocks in order to draw 
general inferences concerning the event. Thus, CAARs are measured as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  (𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                      (5)     
where N is the number of issuers in the sample. 
To test whether the CAARs are significantly different from zero on a statistical basis, both parametric 
and non-parametric tests are employed. 
                                                            
10 This index contains the constituents of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small Cap Index. 
11 This index contains the 30 largest companies by full market capitalization on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board.  
12 This index contains the constituents of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 70 Index on the Bursa 
Malaysia Main Board. 
13 This index is a part of the FTSE Emerging series under the FTSE All World Index. 
14 This index is a market capitalization-weighted index of free float. 
15 We use 14 different event windows, considering an event window of 60 days before the issuance to 60 days after the issuance date. This 
concerns five symmetric event windows (1-day [0,0], 3-day [-1,+1], 5-day [-2,+2], 7-day [-3,+3], and 121-day [-60,+60] windows) and 9 
asymmetric ones ( 4-day [-1,+2], 4-day [-2,+1], 5-day [-3,+1], 62-day [-60,-1], 62-day [+1,+60], 12-day [-10,-1], 12-day [+1,+10], 22-day [-
20,-1], 22-day [+1,+20] windows). There is no consensus with regard to the ideal length of the event window. However, Chin and Abdullah 
(2012) concluded that 60 days is an adequate period for examining the effect of any event on the stock price. A weakness of past studies is 
the application of shorter event windows, ranging from 1 to 20 days before and after the event (Chent et al., 2005; Martel and Padron, 2006). 
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For parametric tests, the conventional t-test for CAAR(τ1,τ2) is estimated as:  
  t − statistic =  
CAAR(τ1,τ2)
σ̂CAAR(τ1,τ2)
                                                                                                    (6) 
where σ̂CAAR(τ1,τ2) is the standard deviation of CAAR(τ1,τ2) over the estimation window. Under the 
null hypothesis, CAAR(𝜏1,𝜏2) is equal to zero. 
The standardized residual test advocated by Patell (1976) assumes that ARs are uncorrelated, and that 
variance is constant over time, implying that this test is robust with regard to heteroscedastic event-
window ARs. The standardized residual test statistic for the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance is then identified as: 
  TPatell =  
1
√N
 ∑
CSARi(τ1,τ2)
S(CSARi)
N
i=1
                                                                                                    (7)   
where CSARi(𝜏1,𝜏2) is the cumulative standardized abnormal return defined in equation (9) and 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖) is the standard deviation of 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 defined in equation (10):  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2) = ∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
𝜏2
𝑡=𝜏1
                                                                                                             (8) 
𝑆 (𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖) = √(𝜏2 − 𝜏1 + 1)
𝑀𝑖−𝑑
𝑀𝑖−2𝑑 
                                                                                                   (9)             
 
The standardized cross-sectional test developed by Boehmer et al. (1991) combines the standardized 
residual test with an empirical variance estimate. It is based on the cross section of event window 
ARs, which is robust to event-induced variance increases of share returns.  
Consequently, the standardized cross-sectional test statistic for the null hypothesis of the absence of 
abnormal returns is given as: 
      𝑇𝐵𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑙. =  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
                                                                                                          (10)     
where the cross-sectional average of 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2) is calculated as equation (11) and the standard 
deviation of  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) is calculated from the cross section of event widow ARs as equation (12):  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                    (11) 
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𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =  √
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
 ∑ [𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2) − 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2)]
𝑁
𝑖=1
2                                                   (12) 
The non-parametric rank test suggested by Corrado (1989) transforms CARs into ranks stock-by-
stock for the time period encompassing both the estimation and the event window:  
𝐾𝑖,𝜏 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏)                                                                                                                                 (13) 
where tied ranks are handled by the approach of mid-ranks.  
Following Corrado and Zivney (1992), a uniform transformation of ranks is adapted in an effort to 
adjust for missing values:  
  𝑈𝑖,𝜏 =
𝐾𝑖,𝜏
(1+𝑀𝑖)
                                                                                                                                                (14) 
where 𝑀𝑖 is the number of non-missing returns for each stock. 
The Corrado rank test statistic for the null hypothesis that the CAAR is equal to zero is identified as: 
 𝑇𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 =  
1
√ 𝑁
 ∑(
𝑁 
𝑖=1
𝑈𝑖,𝜏 − 0.5)/𝑆(𝑈)                                                                                                   (15)      
where the standard deviation of uniform transformation S (U) is defined as:  
  𝑆(𝑈) =
1
𝐿1+𝐿2
 ∑ [
1
√𝑁𝜏
 ∑ (𝑈𝑖,𝜏 − 0.5
𝑁𝜏
𝑖=1 )]𝜏
2                                                                                                 (16) 
                   
where 𝑁 is the number of non-missing returns at day 𝜏. 
As a further test, the Student, the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney, and the Kruskal-Wallis tests were 
performed, in order to investigate if the stock market reaction differs significantly with regard to 
fixed-rate Sukuk as compared to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances. For the Student test, the null 
hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs between fixed-rate Sukuk- and fixed-rate conventional 
bond events is zero. For the other two tests, the null hypothesis is that the fixed-rate Sukuk- and the 
fixed-rate conventional bond event samples have the same general distribution. 
To test the robustness of the results obtained by means of the univariate analysis, regressions of the 
CARs based on a sample of 87 Sukuk and 61 conventional bond issuances for the overall period were 
conducted. The reason for the lower sample size was that each firm is included in the sample only 
once. It is quite common for firms to issue debt several times during one year or even during one day. 
In cases of multiple yearly issues, the issue with earliest date was included. In cases of multiple daily 
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issues only the issue with the highest coupon and maturity date was included. The dependent variable 
is the CAR computed using the event window [-2, +2] and the market model.   
The main independent variable is the dummy variable for Sukuk, which is 1 if the issue is a Sukuk or 
0 otherwise.16 Following Godlewski et al. (2013), we check for issue-specific and issuer-specific 
characteristics as well as for industry effects using the following regression model: 17  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
18                                                                                          (17) 
To ensure the absence of multicollinearity, a Pearson Correlation Matrix was performed (Table 3) 
which shows no multicollinearity present in the data. Table 4 presents the independent variables used 
in the above regression model as well as of the expectations with regard to the nature of the 
relationship between anticipated variables and bond issuance-induced CARs. 
INSERT Table 3 here 
 
INSERT Table 4 here 
 
4. Empirical Findings  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
We begin our analysis by reporting the summary statistics. Table 5 includes the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, median, and maximum of conventional bond and Sukuk. As can be seen from 
Table 5, the average amounts borrowed and received by conventional bond issuances were slightly 
higher than those associated with Sukuk issuances. On average, the maturity of Sukuk issuances was 
almost twice as long as of conventional bonds issues (117 months vs. 66 months, respectively). This 
implies that these financial securities provide higher total returns with regard to current yield and 
capital gains, as well as higher investment risk. However, the findings indicate that the average fixed 
coupon rate on Sukuk was only slightly higher than for conventional bonds (5.36% vs. 5.29%) and 
that fixed-rate conventional bonds in Malaysia are issued at a deeper discount as compared to fixed-
rate Sukuk (99.76% vs. 99.97% of par), thus indicating a greater capital appreciation potential for 
bondholders. This provisional ascertainment is interesting given that fixed-rate Sukuk are not 
                                                            
16 Outliers within the dependent and independent variables were identified by plotting the variables against the unstandardized residuals. In 
order to mitigate the effect of these extreme values, which can affect the regression result dramatically, the outliers were transformed instead 
of deleted. Hence, the sample was winsorized at a level of 10%. 
17 Data for issuer characteristics is extracted from the DataStream one year prior to the bonds issuance. This is in line with the methods 
applied in past studies such as Pandey (2004), Guha and Kar (2006) and Chin and Abdullah (2013). Table 4 provides a detailed description 
of the independent variables used in this regression model as well as our expectations with regard to the nature of the relationship between 
anticipated variables and bond issuance-induced CARs. 
18 The equation (18) was estimated using OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors HAC (Newey-West) in order to overcome 
the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
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associated with higher investment risk as compared to their conventional benchmark, notwithstanding 
their longer maturity. It can be inferred that Sukuk- issuing firms are, similarly to conventional bond 
issuers, keen on returns, regardless of Sukuk’s longer maturity. In general, the findings suggest no 
significant difference in the total returns composition, and hence in investment risk, by bond type. 
There is only a significant difference in the maturity of the issuances. 
 
INSERT Table 5 here 
 
For the characteristics of issuers of Sukuk and conventional bonds, Table 6 presents descriptive 
statistics by issuer type and shows that the firms that were used to issue Sukuk tend to be smaller than 
the firms issuing conventional bonds in terms of balance sheet assets. In addition, there is no high 
difference in the equity to assets ratio of these two issuer types, indicating that both issuers are 
similarly indebted and hence exposed to similar financial risk. On the other hand, the average interest 
coverage ratio (EBIT to interest expense on debt) of conventional bond issuers is significantly higher 
than that of Sukuk issuers (21.67 vs. 10.82).  This finding implies that, on average, conventional bond 
issuers perform better and face less solvency problems than Sukuk issuers. Furthermore, all 
profitability ratios stated in Table 6 suggest that firms issuing conventional bonds experience a better 
financial and operating position than firms raising funds through Sukuk. Nevertheless, the achieved 
profitability ratios do not indicate poor financial and operating positions for Sukuk issuers. Indeed, 
these results show that Sukuk issuers also have a strong financial profile. For the statistically 
significant differences in the characteristics of the issuers of Sukuk and of conventional bonds, we 
find that firms that were used to issue conventional bonds are more profitable and have more interest 
expense on debt than those issuing Sukuk. 19 
 
INSERT Table 6 here 
 
4.2. Univariate analysis  
Now we move on the results of the univariate analysis. Table 7 presents the CAAR estimations, which 
were obtained using a market model and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS index as a proxy for 
market return. Table 8 presents the results of the Student, the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney and the 
Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference between CAARs.  Panel A of Table 7 shows that the Malaysian 
stock market reaction for the overall period is found to be positive to the issuance of Sukuk in most 
                                                            
19 However, it cannot be concluded that firms issuing Sukuk are in a worse financial state and could be labelled as low quality borrowers. 
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event windows. The symmetric event windows [0,0], [-2,+2] and [-3,+3], and the asymmetric event 
windows [-1,+2], [-2,+1], [+1,+10] and [1,+20] show significant and positive results according to 
either one or two statistical tests. However, only the CAAR at 0.28% for the short symmetric event 
window [0,0] was found to be significantly different from zero across all three applied statistical tests. 
Given the fact that only 1 out of 14 event windows are robust with regard to all the applied statistical 
tests, it seems fairly reasonable to suggest no strong evidence for a shareholder wealth effect of Sukuk 
issuance. Also, Panel A of Table 7 shows that for most event windows, CAARs are positive for 
conventional bond issuances for the overall period. However, CAARs of conventional bonds are 
significantly different from zero only for the short symmetric event window [-2,+2] and only 
according to the Patell Z test at a 10% level, thus implying very weak evidence for shareholder wealth 
effect creation through conventional bond issuances. Panel A of Table 8 demonstrates that the 
difference of CAARs between Sukuk and conventional bond issuances is only significant for the 
event window [-20,-1]. Both the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney and the Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null 
hypothesis of equal CAARs by type of issuance (Sukuk vs. conventional bond) for the event window 
[-20,-1] for the overall period. However, this difference is only significant at a 10% level of 
significance. In addition, using the Student tests we found insignificant findings for the overall period. 
Consequently, these tests suggest that the stock market does not react highly significantly differently 
to these two types of issuances and does not discriminate between fixed-rate Sukuk and fixed-rate 
conventional bonds, which is in line with the findings presented in Panel A of Table 7. Thus, this 
finding provides support for hypothesis 1.  
Overall, these results indicate that there is no significant market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- and to 
fixed-rate conventional bond issuances in the larger time frame and over the period 2000 through to 
2015. Such evidence is confirmed when using various statistical tests. We attribute this finding to the 
opposing effects, as conventional bond issuances positively signal the quality of the companies, 
thereby reducing the adverse selection problem arising from the existence of information asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders (Ross, 1977). Further, it can also scale down agency costs and 
morally hazardous behavior resulting from the conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986) and thus lead to positive shareholder wealth effects. On the other hand, 
debt issuance may signal bad news about a company’s future internal financing (Miller and Rock, 
1985). Furthermore, it can also lead to an increase in agency costs caused by interest conflicts 
between managers and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), thus leading to negative shareholder 
wealth effects. We attribute the finding of no highly significant difference in the Malaysian stock 
market reactions to fixed-rate Sukuk- and to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances during the period 
2000 through to 2015 to the expectations of stock market participants regarding the nature of fixed-
rate Sukuk from two perspectives. First, investors believed that fixed-rate Sukuks are not suitably 
compliant with Sharia, and they soon discovered their similarity to conventional bonds’. Second, 
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Stock market investors are rational and hence have inquired for information on the fundamentals of 
Sharia related to Sukuk structures and characteristics, which lead investors to perceive fixed-rate 
Sukuk as being like fixed-rate conventional bonds, rather than as “being neither debt nor equity”, as 
derived from Sharia. 
However, this finding is in contrast with the recent results of the study by Godlewski et al. (2013), 
which documented that the stock market reacts differently to the issuance of Sukuk- as compared to 
conventional bonds. While conventional bond issuances are associated with no stock market reaction, 
Sukuk issuances are associated with a negative stock market reaction. Godlewski et al. (2013) 
attributed their results of the negative stock market reaction to Sukuk issuance to the following 
expectations of stock market participants: 1) Stock market investors may have the opinion that firms, 
that are in a poor financial shape or have even been excluded from the traditional bond market, will 
make use of the excess demand for Sukuk, especially from Islamic banks. 2) Stock market 
participants may take the view that an adverse selection mechanism may lead to companies with low 
profit expectations to favour Sukuk issuance with a profit-and-loss sharing structure, over 
conventional bond issuance. This implies that investors associate the issuance of Sukuk with a low 
quality of the borrower.  
For the analysis related to the pre-crisis period, Panel B of Table 7 shows that Sukuk issuance reported 
significant and positive CAARs for two of the long asymmetric event windows [+1, +10] and [+1, 
+20], and one of the largest symmetric event window [-60, +60]. It is worth noting that the maximum 
significant CAAR (5.45%) of Sukuk issuance is on the long symmetric event window [-60, +60], 
while the minimum significant CAAR (2.15%) is on the long asymmetric window [+1, +10]. 
However, we find only the asymmetric event window [+1, +10] is significantly different from zero 
when using all three applied statistical tests. Consequently, there is little or no evidence for a 
shareholder wealth effect of Sukuk issuance during the pre-crisis period. Meanwhile, no significant 
CAARs are reported for conventional bond issuances across all event windows in the pre-crisis 
period. In other words, there is no wealth effect of conventional bond issuances on the stock market 
during the pre-crisis period. The finding of no significant difference in the Malaysian stock market 
reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- and fixed-rate conventional bond issuances before the global financial 
crisis is, again, attributable to the stock market participant’s correct perception that fixed-rate Sukuk, 
that are offered in the bond market do not comply with Sharia, since they violate at least the 
prohibition of fixed return and thus mirror fixed-rate conventional bonds.  In addition, we find few 
differences between post-crisis period and the two other periods considered. First, stock markets tend 
to be more inefficient during the pre-crisis period as compared to other chosen periods, since 
significant results were only obtained on long event windows. In other words, before the crisis 
shareholders appeared to underreact to Sukuk issuances and it took them longer to absorb the news. 
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Second, the issuance induced CAARs of Sukuk during the pre-crisis period are higher when compared 
to those during the overall and post-crisis periods. Panel B in Table 8 shows that none of the statistical 
tests for the difference of CAARs by type of issuance display significant results across all event 
windows for the pre-crisis period. This means that the stock market reacts in a similar manner to the 
issuances of fixed-rate Sukuk- and fixed-rate conventional bonds. This lends support to hypothesis 2.  
With regard to the post-crisis period, Panel C of Table 7 shows that the average computed CAARs are 
positive for Sukuk issuances in the post-crisis period across all event windows. Notably, the CAARs 
of Sukuk issuances are positive and significantly different from zero according to all three applied 
statistical tests for the symmetric event window [-2, +2] and for the asymmetric event windows [-1, 
+2] and [-20,-1]. The CAARs for the symmetric event windows [0,0], [-1,+1], and [-3,+3], and for the 
asymmetric event windows [-2,+1] and [+1,+10] are also significantly different from zero, although 
admittedly only according to either one or two statistical tests. Therefore, these tests suggest that there 
is clear evidence for a wealth effect for the shareholders of Sukuk issuers during the post-crisis period, 
ranging between 0.24% for event window [0,0] and 1.99% for event window [-20,-1]. Meanwhile, the 
CAARs of conventional bond issuances for the symmetric event windows [-2,+2] and [-3,+3] and for 
the asymmetric event windows [-1,+2] and [+1,+10] are significantly different from zero according to 
either one or two statistical tests applied, ranging from 0.70% for event window [-2,+2] to 1.73% for 
event window [+1,+10]. However, only the event window [+1, +10] was found to be significantly 
different from zero according to all three applied statistical tests at the 5% level. Therefore, we 
conclude that there is no clear evidence for a wealth effect for the shareholders of conventional bond 
issuers for the post-crisis period. 
Overall, the present study has identified similar patterns between the CAARs of Sukuk- and of 
conventional bond issuances. For the post-crisis period, the maximum CAAR of both Sukuk and 
conventional bond issuance was registered on the long asymmetric event window, whereas the 
minimum CAAR of both was registered on the short symmetric event window. This suggests no 
difference in the market reaction with respect to the time of both issuances, regardless of the sign of 
the market reaction. This study also ascertains that the number of significant CAARs of Sukuk 
issuances is reduced as the event window increases. This is an interesting finding, and might have 
resulted from the shareholders increasingly strong confidence in Sukuk as a financing source.  
With respect to the results of statistical difference tests for the difference of CAARs by type of issue 
for the post crisis-period as shown in Panel C of Table 8, the Student test indicates that the mean 
difference of CAARs in Sukuk and in conventional bond issuances is significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level of significance for the asymmetric event window [-20,-1], implying that the CAAR 
of Sukuk issuances is higher than that of conventional bond issuances for event window [-20,-1]. This 
is further supported by both the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney and the Kruskal-Wallis tests, which 
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indicates that there is a significant difference of CAARs with respect to the median between Sukuk- 
and conventional bond issuances for the same event window [-20,-1] at the 5% level. Given that all 
three test statistics show a significant difference of CAARs by type of issue for the event window [-
20,-1], which suggests that there is a highly significant difference in the market reaction to Sukuk and 
to conventional bond issuances after the global financial crisis, which is in line with hypothesis 3.  
Overall, these results indicate that while there is no significant market reaction to conventional bond 
issues, we observe a significant positive stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk issuances after the 
global financial crisis. This could be attributed to the larger captive investor base for Sukuk securities, 
which creates cost advantages for Sukuk issuers and hence leads to lower cost of capital.  
INSERT Table 7 here 
INSERT Table 8 here 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
As a robustness test we estimate CAAR over selected event windows following the issuance of fixed-
rate Sukuk and conventional bonds, once again using market models and conducting the difference 
significance tests using four different market indices of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI, the FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia Top 100, the FTSE Malaysia and TR Malaysia L. The results show that the CAAR 
estimations obtained using different market indices all provide almost exactly the same pattern of 
results, and hence validate the results of the CAAR estimation based on the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS index. Using difference significance tests as above, we find that the same pattern of results 
hold, and thus again support the validity of the difference significance test, based on the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia EMAS index.20 
To test the robustness of the results obtained by means of the market model, a multivariate analysis 
was conducted to identify the determinants of CAR. Consequently, the CAR of the event window that 
includes day -2 to day 2 is regressed on the data variables. Since the multivariate analysis sample is 
based upon the overall period, the output of the multivariate regression analysis, which is free of 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems can also validate the results with 
respect to the overall period. The overall period was chosen, as it provides the largest sample size. 
Table 9 presents the estimates for various sets of independent variables to test the sensitivity of the 
results with regard to the inclusion of different controls. The results achieved indicate that the variable 
“Sukuk” is negative and insignificant in all estimates, thus validating the finding of an insignificant 
stock market reaction to Sukuk issuance for the overall period, which was derived from the univariate 
analysis. Hence, this finding lends support to hypothesis 1, which states that there is no significant 
                                                            
20 Results are available upon request. 
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difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk as compared to fixed-rate 
conventional bond issuances in the period 2000 through 2015.  
With regard to control variables, the variable “EBIT to interest expenses on debt” tends to have only a 
minimal impact on the CARs with a significance level of 10%. Concerning the industry dummy 
variables, “the consumer products and services” sector as well as the “retail” sector, are found to be 
significantly negative at the 10 % and at the 1% level respectively. This means that when companies 
within these sectors perform the issuance, the CAR would be lower.  
 
INSERT Table 9 here 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the stock market reactions to the issuance of fixed-rate Sukuk (ethical bonds) 
as compared to fixed-rate conventional bonds, and, specifically, whether there is a difference in the 
shareholder wealth effect of these two types of issuances. To examine the shareholder wealth effects, 
we used the conventional event study methodology and data on the Malaysian publicly listed non-
financial companies from 2000 to 2015. The event study calculated the abnormal returns for all the 
individual companies in the full sample and subsamples, and cumulative abnormal returns were 
estimated using 14 different event windows of which five were symmetric and nine were asymmetric. 
Our initial investigation suggests that there is no supportive evidence for a robust difference, using 
various applied statistical tests, in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- and to 
fixed-rate conventional bond issuances during the overall period 2000 through 2015. Hence, we 
divided the full sample into pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and post-crisis period (2010-2015). 
According to the results of this analysis, we found insignificant difference in the Malaysian stock 
market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- and to fixed-rate conventional bond issuances before the global 
financial crisis. Interestingly, however, our results demonstrated a supportive and highly significant 
difference in the Malaysian stock market reaction to fixed-rate Sukuk- and to fixed-rate conventional 
bond issuances after the global financial crisis. While the findings associated with the overall and pre-
crises periods could be attributed to accurate shareholder interpretation of the real nature of fixed-rate 
Sukuk perceived by stock market participants (investors succeeded to realize that fixed-rate Sukuk are 
not in compliance with the rules of Sharia and soon discovered their similarity to conventional bonds), 
the results on the post crisis sample could be attributed solely to the higher liquidity of Sukuk, 
resulting from a larger captive investor base, which creates cost advantages for Sukuk issuers and 
hence leads to lower cost of capital, and not to differences between these two types of issuances. 
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Arguably, there are many implications for research and practice from this study. Although currently 
still small, Sukuk is well integrated and has grown significantly. By comparing Sukuk with other 
similar ethical sources of traded capital may provide insights into the globalisation of such economic, 
trade and financial reforms. Furthermore, the fixed-rate Sukuk issuances created greater shareholder 
wealth effects than conventional bond issuances in Malaysia after the global financial crisis resulting 
in the higher liquidity of the former. This will lead to a further increase in the remaining volume of 
Sukuk in Malaysia because conventional publicly listed non-financial companies will start to increase 
capital through Sukuk due to the lower cost of capital, which in turn will benefit their shareholders. 
The results of this study, therefore, may be useful for investors and regulators in many other emerging 
markets outside Malaysia in terms of fixed-rate Sukuk and fixed-rate conventional bonds investment 
planning. Our findings could also be of interest to policy- makers who are continually adopting 
regulations in attempts to curb possible presumable conflicts of interest. Finally, for the financial 
managers, banks and other financial institutions, our results show that despite their original intention, 
fixed-rate Sukuk are not an alternative source of financing to fixed-rate conventional bonds. 
Despite filling some of the gaps in current Sukuk literature, this study highlights a number of others 
for future research. For example, different types of issuers (such as sector and rating) could be used to 
compare conventional bond issuances with Sukuk. Furthermore, similar comparisons could be 
researched according to characteristics such as coupon type, principal amount, and maturity. In 
addition, exchange-based and partnership-based Sukuk could be compared in terms of their 
performance. Furthermore, market risk measures such as Beta and VAR, Jensen Alpha, Sharpe ratio, 
Treynor ratio, and Sortino ratio could all be drawn upon to analyse the risk-return characteristics of 
fixed-rate Sukuk and conventional bonds. Such research would add to that existing and widen existing 
knowledge about a key area of the financial world that looks set to continue to grow in the future. 
 
 
 
  
26 | P a g e  
   
References 
Ahmad, N. and Rahim, S. (2014). “CAAR Estimations by Sectors of Sukuk Issuance”, International 
Conference on Economics, Education and Humanitities (ICEEH’14) Dec. 10-11, 2014 Bali 
(Indonesia). 
Ahmad, N. and Rusgianto, S. (2013). “Information Content of Post-Crisis Sukuk. Announcement in 
Malaysia”, Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 13(1), 50 – 55.  
 
Alam, N., Hassan M. and Haque, M. (2013). “Are Islamic bonds different from conventional bonds?”, 
International evidence from capital market tests. Borsa Istanbul Review, 13(3), 22-29. 
 
Ashhari, Z., Chun L. and Nassir, A. (2009). “Conventional vs Islamic Bond Announcements: The 
Effects on Shareholders’s Wealth”, International Journal of Business and Management, 4(6), 105-111. 
 
Athern, K. (2009). “Sample selection and event study estimation”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 
16(3), 466-482. 
Azmat, S., Skully M. and  Brown, K. (2014). “Credit risk in Islamic joint venture bond’’, Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 103(7), 129-145. 
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J. and Poulson, A. (1991). “Event-Study Methodology under Conditions of 
Event-Induced Variance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 30 (2), 253-272.  
Brown, S. and Warner, J. (1985). “Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31. 
Cakir, S. and Raei, F. (2007). “Sukuk vs. Eurobonds: Is there a difference in value-at-risk?”, 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/07/237.  
Carhart, M. (1997). “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance”, The Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 
57-82.  
 
Chen, C., Dong, L. and Wen, M. (2005). “Backdoor equity financing, firm characteristics, and 
shareholders’ wealth”, Center for China and Business Research.  
 
Chin, S. and Abdullah, N. (2012). “Announcements Effect of Corporate Bond Issuance and Its 
Determinants”, Contemporary Economics, 7(1), 5-18. 
27 | P a g e  
   
Corrado, C. (1989). “A Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Security-Price Performance in Event 
Studies”, Journal of Financial Economics, 23(2), 385-396.  
De Jong, A., Kabir, R. and Nguyen, T. (2008). “Capital Structure around the World: the Roles of Firm 
and Country-Specific Determinants”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(9), 1954-1969. 
 
De Miguel, A. and Pindado, J. (2001). “Determinant of Capital Structure: Evidence from Spanish 
Panel Data”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(1), 77-99. 
 
Dutta, A. (2014). “Does Calendar Time Portfolio Approach Really Lack Power?”, International 
Journal of Business and Management, 9 (9), 260-266. 
 
Eckbo, B. (1986). “Valuation effects of corporate debt offerings”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
15(1–2), 119-151. 
 
Elian, M. and Young-Taft, T. (2014). “Stock Market Reaction to Debt-Based Securities: Empirical 
Evidence”, Frontiers in Finance and Economic, 11 (2), 46-72. 
 
Fama, E. and French, K. (1993). “Common Risk Factors in the Returns of Stocks and Bonds”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33 (1), 3-56. 
 
Godlewski, C., Turk-Aris, R. and Weill, L. (2013). “Sukuk vs. conventional bonds: A stock market 
perspective”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 41(3), 745-761.  
 
Godlewski, C., Turk-Ariss, R., Weill,L. Goel, R. and Mehrotra, A.(2011), Do markets perceive sukuk 
and conventional bonds as different financing instruments?, Bank of Finland, BOFIT,  Institute for 
Economies in Transition, Discussion Papers 6/2011, 1-37. 
Guha, K. and Kar, S. (2006) “The corporate debt market. A firm-level panel study for India (Research 
paper No. 2006/50)”, World Institute for Development Economics Research. 
Howton, S., Howton, S., and Perfect, S. (1998). “The Market Reaction to Straight Debt Issues: The 
Effects of Free Cash Flow”, Journal of Financial Research, 21(2), 219–228.  
 
Ibrahim, Y. and Minai, M. (2009). “Islamic bonds and wealth effects: evidence from Malaysia”, 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 6 (1), 184-191. 
 
28 | P a g e  
   
 
Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report (IFSB) (2015), Level 5, Sasana Kijang, Bank 
Negara Malaysia 2, Jalan Dato’ Onn, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [online], 
available:http://www.ifsb.org/docs/20150520_IFSB%20Islamic%20Financial%20Services%20Industr
y%20Stability%20Report%202015_final.pdf[accessed 5 August 2015]. 
 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976) “Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs, and 
capital structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2), 323-339. 
 
Jensen, M. (1986). “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeover”, American 
Economic Review, 76(2), 323-339. 
 
Kapoor, A. and Pope, R. (1997). “The relationship between corporate debt issuance and changes in 
systematic risk”, Journal of Financial & Strategic Decision, 10(3), 13-22. 
 
Kothari, S. and Warner, J. (2007). “Econometrics of event studies”. In B.E. Eckbo (Ed.), Handbook of 
Corporate Finance, 1, 3-36. Amsterdam: North Holland Elsevier. 
 
Krasker, W. (1986). “Stock Price Movements in Response to Stock Issues under Asymmetric 
Information”, Journal of Finance, 41(1), 93–105. 
 
Leland, H., and Pyle, D. (1977). “Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial 
intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-388.  
 
Lyon, J., Barber, B. and Tsai, C. (1999) “Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 54(1), 165-201.  
 
MacKinlay, A. (1997) “Event Studies in Economics and Finance”, Journal of Economic Literature, 35 
(1), 13-39. 
Martel, M. and Padron, Y. (2006), “Debt and information content: Evidence in the Spanish stock 
market”, International Research Journal of Finance & Economics, 4(1), 213-219. 
 
McMillen, M. (2007). “Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Markets Development”, 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 7(2), 427-467. 
 
Miller, D. and Puthenpurackal, J. (2002). “The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of 
29 | P a g e  
   
International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 11(4), 455-485. 
 
Miller, M. and Rock, K. (1985). “Dividend policy under asymmetric information”, Journal of 
Finance, 40 (4), 1031-1051. 
 
Miller, M. and Modigliani, F. (1963) “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital : A 
Correction”, American Economic Review, 53 (3), 433-43. 
Miller, N., Challoner, J. and Atta, A. (2007). “UK welcomes the Sukuk”, International Financial Law 
Review, 26 (5), 24-25. 
Modirzadehbami, S. and Mansoufar, G. (2011). “Information content of Islamic private debt 
announcement: evidence from Malaysia”, World Academy of Science Engineering and Technology, 
77(12), 572-578.  
 
Myer, S. and Majluf, N. (1984). “Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms have 
Information that Investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, 13 (2), 187-221. 
Pandey, I. (2004). “Capital structure, profitability and market structure: Evidence from Malaysia”, 
Asia Pacific Journal of Economics & Business, 8(2), 78-91. 
Patell, J. (1976). “Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical 
Tests”, Journal of Accounting Research, 14(2), 246-274.  
Rahim, S. and Ahmad, N. (2014). “Stock Market Reactions Following Sukuk Announcement: An 
Analysis of Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (2004-2011)” IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance, 
5 (6), 29-35. 
 
Rahim, S. and Ahmad, N. (2015). “Asymmetric Market Reactions to Sukuk Issuance”, International 
Journal of Novel Research in Humanity and Social Sciences, 2 (3), 48-56. 
 
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1995). “What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence 
from International Data”, Journal of Finance, 50 (5), 1421-1460.  
Ramasamy, R., Munisamy, S. and Helmi, M. (2011). “Relative risk of Islamic Sukuk over government 
and conventional bonds”, Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 11 (6), 4-12. 
30 | P a g e  
   
Ross, S. (1977). “The determination of financial structure: The incentive-sginalling approach”, Bell 
Journal of Economics, 8 (1), 23-40. 
 
Saeed, A., and Salah,O. (2014). “Development of Sukuk: Pragmatic and Idealist Approaches to Sukuk 
Structure”, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 29 (1), 41-52. 
 
Salah, O. (2014). Sukuk structures: Legal engineering under Dutch law Tilburg: Eleven International 
Publishing. 
 
Shao, C., Sheng, S., Hsing, A. and Chia, W. (2007). “Investment opportunities, free cash flow, and 
stock valuation effects of secured debt offerings”, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 28 
(2), 123-145.  
 
Sherif, M. and Shaairi, N. (2013). "Determinants of demand on family Takaful in Malaysia", Journal 
of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 4 (1), 26 – 50. 
 
Stephen, P., and David, J. (1996). “Stock Price Effect of High-Yield Debt Issues”, Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 20 (1), 133-146. 
 
Suchard, J. and Singh, M. (2006). “The determinants of the hybrid security issuance decision for 
Australian firms”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 14 (3), 269-290. 
Usmani, M. (2007). “Sukuk and their Contemporary Application” (Translated from the original 
Arabic by Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo), In AAOIFI Sharia Council meeting, Saudi Arabia.  
Wilson, R. (2008). “Innovation in structuring of Sukuk securities”, Humanomics, 24 (3), 170-181. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 | P a g e  
   
Figure 1: Sukuk Outstanding Trend 
Source: Bloomberg, IFIS, Zawya, KFHR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg, IFIS, Zawya, KFHR 
Figure 2: Sukuk Issuance Trend 
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Table 1: Sukuk vs. Conventional Bonds 
 
 Conventional Bonds Sukuk 
Asset 
ownership 
Bonds do not give the investor a share of ownership 
in the asset, project, business, or joint venture they 
support. They are a debt obligation from the issuer 
to the bond holder. 
Sukuk give the investor 
partial ownership in the asset 
on which the Sukuk are 
based. 
Investment 
criteria 
Generally, bonds can be used to finance any asset, 
project, business, or joint venture that complies with 
local legislation. 
The asset on which Sukuk are 
based must be Sharia-
compliant. 
Issue unit Each bond represents a share of debt. Each Sukuk represents a 
share of the underlying asset. 
Issue price The face value of a bond price is based on the 
issuer’s credit worthiness (including its rating). 
The face value of Sukuk is 
based on the market value of 
the underlying asset. 
Investment 
rewards 
and risks 
Bond holders receive regularly scheduled (and often 
fixed rate) interest payments for the life of the bond, 
and their principal amount is guaranteed to be 
returned at the bond’s maturity date. 
Sukuk holders receive a share 
of profits from the underlying 
asset (and accept a share of 
any loss incurred). 
Effects of 
costs 
Bond holders are not generally affected by costs 
related to the asset, project, business, or joint 
venture they support. The performance of the 
underlying asset does not affect investor rewards. 
Sukuk holders are affected by 
costs related to the underlying 
asset. Higher costs may 
translate to lower investor 
profits and vice versa. 
Source: Jamaldeen, F., How Sukuk (Islamic Bonds) Differ from Conventional Bonds, Islamic Finance for Dummies 
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Table 2: Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes (EBIT): 
This figure represents the earnings of a company before interest 
expense and income taxes. It was measured by taking the pre-tax 
income, adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting 
interest capitalized. 
Interest Expense on 
Debt: 
This figure represents the service charge for the use of capital 
before the reduction for interest capitalized. 
Operating Profit 
Margin: 
This figure was calculated by the division of Operating Income by 
Net Sales or Revenues. 
Total Asset: 
This figure represents the sum of total current assets, long-term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Total Liability: 
This figure represents all short and long-term obligations expected 
to be satisfied by the company. 
Total Equity: 
This figure represents the sum of common equity, preferred stock, 
minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and deferred 
tax liability in untaxed reserves. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Coupon Maturity Ln (total assets) Equity/total assets
EBIT/interest 
expense on debt
Operating profit margin Return on Asset
Coupon 1.00
----- 
Maturity 0.22 1.00
(0.008)*** ----- 
Ln (total assets) -0.38 0.21 1.00
(0.000)*** (0.010)** ----- 
Equity/total assets -0.03 -0.26 -0.30 1.00
(0.749) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** ----- 
EBIT/interest 
expense on debt
-0.10 -0.05 -0.17 0.28 1.00
(0.236) (0.534) (0.036)** (0.000)*** ----- 
Operating profit margin -0.20 -0.14 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.00
(0.017)** (0.100) (0.370) (0.251) (0.390) ----- 
Return on Asset -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 0.14 0.29 0.42 1.00
(0.079)* (0.038)** (0.062)* (0.093)* (0.000)* (0.000)*** ----- 
This table provides the correlations between the variables used in this study. The values in parantheses are the p-values for t-statistics.
*Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 10% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
**Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy typeat the 5% level.GGGGGGggGGGGGGGGGHHGGGG
***Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 1% level. GGGGGGGGGgGGGGGGGGGGGGG
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No. Independent variable Classification Definition Hypothesis Development Expected sign
1 Sukuk Issue-specific Dummy variable equals to 1 if the issue is a Sukuk and 0 
otherwise.
+
2 Coupon Issue-specific Coupon represents the fixed interest rate for that specific 
issue
Ashari et al. (2009) indicated that coupon is inversely 
related with the CAR.
-
3 Maturity Issue-specific Bond maturity, measured of the the issue date In general, the longer the term, the higher the coupon. 
Bondholders want to be compensated for the additional 
risk of tying up money for a longer period (Ashari et 
al. 2009). 
-
4 Ln (total assets) Issuer-specific Natural logarithm of  total assets denominated in Malaysian 
Ringit as a proxy of firm size.
Stein (1992) suggested that firm size signals the degree 
of information asymmetry. It is believed that large 
firms tend to have greater coverage, draw more 
attention and experience greater checking by stock 
analysts and institutional investors. 
+
5 Equity/total assets Issuer-specific Total equity divided by total assets. This is a measure of a 
firm's equity level.
Li et al. (2014) indicated that companies with lower 
equity level are regarded more risky and bear higher 
costs of fiancial distress cost.
-
6 EBIT/interest expense on 
debt
Issuer-specific EBIT divided by total interest expense on debt. This is a 
measure of a company's ability to meet its interest payment 
(interest coverage ratio).
Godlewski et al. (2013) found no significant influence.
/
7 Operating profit margin Issuer-specific Operating Income divided by Net Sales or Revenues as a 
proxy for profitability.
Lewis et al. (2003) found no significant effect of 
profitability in the US market.
/
8 Return on Asset Issuer-specific EBIT divided by total assets as a proxy for profitability. Stein (1992) concluded that profitability is negatively 
correlated with the probability of the appearance 
financial distress. Furthermore, low profitability is 
associated with higher risk uncertainty and greater 
probability of a shift towards riskier investment policy.
-
9 Real Estate Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is real estate and 
0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
10 Industrials Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is industrials and 
0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
11 Consumer Staples Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry consumer staples 
and 0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
12 Consumer Products and 
Services
Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is consumer 
products and services and 0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
13 Telecommunications Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is 
telecommunications and 0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
14 Energy and Power Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is energy and 
power and 0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
15 Materials Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is materials and 0 
otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
16 High Technology Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is hihg 
technology and 0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
17 Retail Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is retail and 0 
otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
18 Healthcare Industry effect Dummy variable equals to 1 if the industry is healthcare and 
0 otherwise
Lack of empirical evidence 
 +/-
Table 4: Definition of the Independent Variables 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Bond Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics by Issuer Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable N  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
Conventional bonds
Principal amount
inc. overallotment sold 87 91.87 39.49 704.52 1.32 125.67
Proceeds amount          
inc. overallotment sold 87 91.57 39.49 704.52 1.32 125.37
Coupon 87 5.29 5.00 8.85 2.00 1.41
Issue price 87 99.76 100.00 100.00 88.65 1.45
Maturity 87 5.55** 5.07 15.22 1.01 3.19
Sukuk
Principal amount
inc. overallotment sold 122 87.89 60.28 811.53 2.72 107.85
Proceeds amount          
inc. overallotment sold 122 87.85 60.28 811.53 2.72 107.83
Coupon 116 5.36 5.05 9.80 3.00 1.39
Issue price 122 99.97 100.00 100.00 97.34 0.25
Maturity 122 9.84** 5.07 99.99 1.01 19.05
This table provides the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation for several characteristics of the
issuances by bond type. All variables are given in millions of US Dollars, with the exception of coupon and issue price
(percent), maturity (years), and number of observations. The principal amount incl. overallotment sold represents all
tranches of the transaction and is calculated by accumulating the principal amount plus overallotment sold for each tranche
within the transaction. The proceeds amount incl. overallotment sold is calculated by accumulating the principal amount
plus overallotment sold multiplied by offer price for each tranche within the transaction. Coupon is the fixed interest rate of
the security. Issue price is the price of the security at the date of issue. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG                                                                                                       
*Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 10% level.  GGGGGGGGGGGGG
**Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy typeat the 5% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
***Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 1% level.   GGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Variable N  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
Conventional bonds
EBIT 61 738.94 241.31 3,079.44 -226.59 903.75
EBIT/interest expense on debt 61 21.67 3.82 595.18 -1.68 82.72
Equity/total assets 61 0.47 0.47 0.76 0.21 0.15
Interest expense on debt 61 236.85* 50.39 1,910.80 0.35 371.33
Operating profit margin 61 16.78*** 14.43** 49.67 -12.05 12.16
Return on assets 61 0.10** 0.07 0.75 -0.03 0.12
Total assets 61 10,827.02 2,981.69 53,619.49 154.65 14,502.25
Total equity 61 3,839.34 1,538.88 17,027.50 72.59 4,411.24
Total liability 61 6,987.68 1,706.05 38,061.75 46.87 10,491.82
Sukuk
EBIT 89 502.82 167.36 3,348.66 -2,370.13 861.31
EBIT/interest expense on debt 89 10.82 4.67 253.44 -12.12 28.23
Equity/total assets 89 0.48 0.49 0.98 0.08 0.16
Interest expense on debt 89 133.71* 34.33 1,910.80 0.15 283.35
Operating profit margin 89 11.76*** 10.77** 47.82 -14.90 9.95
Return on assets 89 0.07** 0.07 0.19 -0.19 0.06
Total assets 89 9,060.12 3,533.01 63,381.60 40.11 12,805.38
Total equity 89 3,911.27 1,585.98 24,036.21 20.82 5,291.85
Total liability 89 5,148.85 1,988.84 47,934.50 19.29 8,555.52
This table provides the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation for several issuer  characteristics by bond type. 
All variables are in millions of Malaysian Ringgit, with the exception of financial ratios and number of observations.
*Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 10% level.GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG     
**Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy typeat the 5% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG     
***Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 1% level.GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG  
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Event window Type of announcement CAAR Pos : Neg t-statistic Patell Z BMP-test Event window Type of announcement CAAR Pos : Neg t-statistic Patell Z BMP-test 
Panel A: Overall period
[0,0] Sukuk 0.28% 72:50 1.75* 2.21** 1.96* [-60,60] Sukuk 0.65% 67:52 0.28 1.06 0.82
Conventional bond -0.06% 42:44 -0.29 -0.24 -0.23 Conventional bond -0.35% 39:46 -0.14 -0.42 -0.32
[-1,1] Sukuk -0.01% 59:63 -0.03 1.26 0.97 [-60,-1] Sukuk 0.75% 63:56 0.50 0.50 0.46
Conventional bond 0.16% 44:42 0.44 0.49 0.47 Conventional bond 0.13% 33:52 0.10 -0.09 -0.09
[-2,2] Sukuk 0.18% 67:55 0.44 2.06** 1.59 [1,60] Sukuk -0.35% 61:58 -0.23 0.74 0.55
Conventional bond 0.61% 49:37 1.19 1.74* 1.39 Conventional bond -0.43% 36:49 -0.25 -0.48 -0.40
[-3,3] Sukuk 0.38% 64:58 0.79 1.89* 1.55 [-10,-1] Sukuk -0.47% 58:61 -1.02 -0.94 -0.96
Conventional bond 0.55% 43:43 1.01 1.50 1.28 Conventional bond 0.36% 44:41 0.67 0.36 0.35
[-1,2] Sukuk 0.22% 70:52 0.56 2.42** 1.81* [1,10] Sukuk 0.62% 70:49 1.15 2.34** 2.24**
Conventional bond 0.43% 44:42 0.98 1.51 1.15 Conventional bond 0.87% 44:41 1.29 1.39 1.24
[-2,1] Sukuk -0.05% 60:62 -0.16 0.97 0.79 [-20,-1] Sukuk 0.79% 75:44 1.04 1.46 1.37
Conventional bond 0.33% 50:36 0.75 0.86 0.77 Conventional bond 0.07% 40:45 0.08 0.38 0.36
[-3,1] Sukuk -0.09% 60:62 -0.24 0.62 0.47 [1,20] Sukuk 0.59% 60:59 0.77 2.27** 1.79*
Conventional bond 0.22% 39:47 0.48 0.63 0.56 Conventional bond 0.59% 44:41 0.68 0.70 0.63
Panel B: Pre-crisis period 
[0,0] Sukuk 0.00% 18:20 0.00 0.12 0.13 [-60,60] Sukuk 5.45% 21:17 1.02 1.78* 1.22
Conventional bond -0.17% 22:25 -0.52 -0.55 -0.45 Conventional bond 0.10% 23:24 0.02 -0.12 -0.08
[-1,1] Sukuk -0.88% 14:24 -1.41 -1.41 -1.36 [-60,-1] Sukuk 4.11% 22:16 1.32 1.23 1.21
Conventional bond 0.01% 22:25 0.02 0.00 0.00 Conventional bond 0.91% 18:29 0.42 0.15 0.15
[-2,2] Sukuk -1.21% 17:21 -1.29 -1.16 -1.12 [1,60] Sukuk 1.33% 18:20 0.39 1.29 0.82
Conventional bond 0.48% 28:19 0.59 0.83 0.68 Conventional bond -0.64% 20:27 -0.23 -0.25 -0.18
[-3,3] Sukuk -0.62% 18:20 -0.70 -0.27 -0.30 [-10,-1] Sukuk -0.59% 17:21 -0.68 -1.14 -1.15
Conventional bond 0.67% 24:23 0.76 1.00 0.92 Conventional bond 1.01% 26:21 1.23 0.90 0.92
[-1,2] Sukuk -1.05% 18:20 -1.20 -1.10 -0.99 [1,10] Sukuk 2.15% 23:15 2.23** 2.65*** 2.51**
Conventional bond 0.13% 23:24 0.18 0.17 0.14 Conventional bond 0.82% 22:25 0.74 0.54 0.47
[-2,1] Sukuk -1.04% 15:23 -1.50 -1.42 -1.49 [-20,-1] Sukuk 1.22% 25:13 1.09 0.86 1.00
Conventional bond 0.37% 25:22 0.51 0.76 0.65 Conventional bond 0.22% 21:26 0.16 0.40 0.34
[-3,1] Sukuk -0.91% 19:19 -1.31 -1.10 -1.18 [1,20] Sukuk 2.22% 21:17 1.46 2.76*** 1.73*
Conventional bond 0.44% 18:29 0.57 0.67 0.57 Conventional bond 1.05% 25:22 0.75 0.76 0.67
Panel C: Post-crisis period
[0,0] Sukuk 0.24% 43:26 1.25 1.96* 1.54 [-60,60] Sukuk 2.32% 42:24 1.12 1.21 1.01
Conventional bond 0.13% 17:14 0.75 0.45 0.51 Conventional bond -1.00% 13:17 -0.41 -0.31 -0.28
[-1,1] Sukuk 0.20% 36:33 0.53 2.15** 1.44 [-60,-1] Sukuk 1.74% 37:29 1.27 0.72 0.65
Conventional bond 0.15% 18:13 0.40 0.45 0.40 Conventional bond -0.80% 13:17 -0.58 -0.38 -0.42
[-2,2] Sukuk 0.76% 42:27 1.89* 3.52*** 2.40** [1,60] Sukuk 0.39% 36:30 0.28 0.78 0.63
Conventional bond 0.70% 17:14 1.22 1.68* 1.17 Conventional bond -0.37% 14:16 -0.26 -0.13 -0.15
[-3,3] Sukuk 0.64% 37:32 1.21 2.57*** 1.80* [-10,-1] Sukuk 0.12% 33:33 0.25 0.19 0.20
Conventional bond 0.92% 17:14 1.38 1.81* 1.27 Conventional bond -0.80% 14:16 -1.30 -1.09 -1.07
[-1,2] Sukuk 0.71% 43:26 1.79* 3.83*** 2.56** [1,10] Sukuk 0.59% 41:25 1.16 1.78* 1.90*
Conventional bond 0.91% 18:13 1.61 2.35** 1.48 Conventional bond 1.73% 20:10 2.31** 2.48** 2.33**
[-2,1] Sukuk 0.24% 37:32 0.63 1.96** 1.37 [-20,-1] Sukuk 1.99% 43:23 2.37** 2.02** 1.77*
Conventional bond -0.06% 19:12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 Conventional bond -0.40% 15:15 -0.48 -0.35 -0.36
[-3,1] Sukuk 0.23% 32:37 0.47 1.63 1.04 [1,20] Sukuk 0.66% 32:34 1.03 1.57 1.59
Conventional bond 0.15% 18:13 0.30 0.35 0.31 Conventional bond 0.85% 17:13 0.79 1.03 0.91
This table displays CAARs obtained using a market model and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS index as a proxy for market return by type of event (Sukuk vs. conventional bond issuances) in the third and the
tenth column, and across fourteen event windows. Panel A provides the results for the overall period (208 events, 122 of which Sukuk and 86 conventional bond issuances), Panel B provides the results for the
pre-crisis period (85 events, 38 of which Sukuk and 47 conventional bond issuances) and Panel C provides results for the post-crisis period (100 events, of which 69 Sukuk and 31 conventional bond issuances).
The number of positive and negative CARs are shown in the fourth and the eleventh column respectively. The fifth and the twelfth column provide the conventional t-statistic of CAARs, while column sixth and
thirteenth show the standardized residual test-statistic (Patell Z). The seventh and last column provides the standardized cross-sectional test statistic (BMP t-stat). GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG 
*Significance at the 10% level.**Significance at the 5% level.***Significance at the 1% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Table 7: CAAR Estimation using a Market Model and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Index 
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Table 8: Difference Significance Tests by Event Type for CAARs  
using FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event window
t Prob. > |t| Z Prob. > |Z| Chi
2
Prob. > Chi
2
Panel A: Overall period
[0,0] 1.343 0.181 1.545 0.122 2.391 0.122
[-1,1] 0.357 0.722 0.032 0.975 0.001 0.974
[-2,2] 0.657 0.512 0.060 0.952 0.004 0.952
[-3,3] 0.236 0.814 0.366 0.714 0.135 0.713
[-1,2] 0.352 0.725 0.467 0.641 0.219 0.640
[-2,1] 0.716 0.475 0.574 0.566 0.331 0.565
[-3,1] 0.527 0.599 0.294 0.769 0.087 0.768
[-60,60] -0.286 0.775 0.861 0.389 0.744 0.389
[-60,-1] -0.295 0.768 1.119 0.263 1.254 0.263
[1,60] -0.036 0.972 0.734 0.463 0.540 0.462
[-10,-1] 1.174 0.242 0.621 0.535 0.387 0.534
[1,10] 0.294 0.769 0.897 0.370 0.807 0.369
[-20,-1] -0.627 0.531 1.823* 0.068 3.329* 0.068
[1,20] 0.008 0.994 0.690 0.490 0.478 0.489
Panel B: Pre-crisis period
[0,0] -0.383 0.703 0.473 0.636 0.228 0.633
[-1,1] 1.035 0.304 0.800 0.424 0.647 0.421
[-2,2] 1.365 0.176 1.030 0.303 1.069 0.301
[-3,3] 1.021 0.310 0.234 0.815 0.057 0.811
[-1,2] 1.064 0.291 0.605 0.545 0.372 0.542
[-2,1] 1.383 0.170 1.304 0.192 1.711 0.191
[-3,1] 1.272 0.207 0.508 0.611 0.263 0.608
[-60,60] -0.796 0.428 1.021 0.307 1.051 0.305
[-60,-1] -0.873 0.385 0.906 0.365 0.829 0.363
[1,60] -0.454 0.651 0.650 0.516 0.428 0.513
[-10,-1] 1.331 0.187 1.092 0.275 1.201 0.273
[1,10] -0.891 0.375 1.383 0.167 1.926 0.165
[-20,-1] -0.536 0.594 1.153 0.249 1.341 0.247
[1,20] -0.566 0.573 0.676 0.499 0.463 0.496
Panel C: Post-crisis period
[0,0] -0.341 0.734 0.671 0.502 0.455 0.500
[-1,1] -0.073 0.942 0.060 0.953 0.004 0.950
[-2,2] -0.075 0.940 0.738 0.461 0.550 0.458
[-3,3] 0.305 0.761 0.134 0.893 0.019 0.890
[-1,2] 0.280 0.780 0.619 0.536 0.387 0.534
[-2,1] -0.466 0.643 0.328 0.743 0.110 0.740
[-3,1] -0.104 0.917 0.402 0.687 0.165 0.685
[-60,60] -0.953 0.343 1.482 0.138 2.208 0.137
[-60,-1] -1.135 0.259 1.395 0.163 1.957 0.162
[1,60] -0.331 0.742 0.652 0.514 0.430 0.512
[-10,-1] -1.105 0.272 0.992 0.321 0.992 0.319
[1,10] 1.262 0.210 0.613 0.540 0.380 0.538
[-20,-1]  -1.747* 0.084 2.130** 0.033 4.555** 0.033
[1,20] 0.156 0.876 0.304 0.761 0.095 0.758
Student test Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test Kruskal-Wallis test 
This table displays the results of the Student, the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney and the Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference between CAARs. It is obtained
using a market model and FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS index as a proxy for market return by type of event (Sukuk vs. conventional bond issuances)
across each of the fourteen event windows. For the first test, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs between Sukuk and conventional bond
events is zero. For the final two tests, the null hypothesis is that the Sukuk and conventional bond events samples derive from identical populations. Panel A
provides results for the overall period (208 events, 122 of which Sukuk and 86 conventional bond issuances), Panel B provides results for the pre-crisis
period (85 events, 38 of which Sukuk and 47 conventional bond issuances) and Panel C provides results for the post-crisis period (100 events, 69 of which
Sukuk and 31 conventional bond issuances). GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG.                                                                                                                                                                                           
*Significance at the 10% level.**Significance at the 5% level.***Significance at the 1% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
39 | P a g e  
   
Table 9: Multivariate Analyses of CARs 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept 0.003 0.002 -0.011 -0.022 -0.030 -0.006
(1,062) (0.203) (-0.355) (-0.903) (-0.751) (-0.153)
Sukuk -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.253) (-0.249) (-0.228) (-0.197) (-0.369) (-0.218)
Coupon -0.012 0.028 0.107 0.149
(-0.069) (0.131) (0.490) (0.655)
Maturity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.499) (0.332) (0.156) (-0.515)
Ln (total assets) 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.488) (0.887) (0.951) (0.560)
Equity/total assets 0.015 0.003 0.002
(0.876) (0.150) (0.065)
EBIT/interest expense on debt 0.001* 0.001
(1.694) (1.159)
Operating profit margin 0.000 0.000
(-0.576) (-0.521)
Return on Asset -0.056 -0.063
(-0.562) (-0.527)
Real Estate -0.013
(-1.058)
Industrials -0.013
(-1.119)
Consumer Staples -0.011
(-1.069)
Consumer Products and Services  -0.027*
(-1.930)
Telecommunications 0.002
(0.180)
Energy and Power -0.015
(-1.197)
Materials -0.006
(-0.480)
High Technology -0.007
(-0.375)
Retail   -0.033***
(-2.851)
Healthcare -0.002
(-0.191)
R
2
0.000 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.034 0.084
Adj. R
2 
-0.006 -0.019 -0.024 -0.012 -0.021 -0.043
F-statistic 0.069 0.081 0.125 0.435 0.619 0.661
Number of observations 148 148 148 148 148 148
Dependent variable: CAR in event window [-2,2]
This table presents the estimations of OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The
dependent variable is the CAR computed for the event window [-2,2]. It is obtained using a market model. The FTSE
Bursa Malaysia EMAS index is used as a proxy of market return. All variables except the dummy variables are
winsorized at a level of 10%. The values in parantheses are t-statistics. GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG                                                                                                                                          
* Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 10% level. GGGGGGGGGGG      
**Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy typeat the 5% level. GGGGGGGGGGGGGG      
***Significant differences for means and medians of the variables by bondy type at the 1% level. GGGGGGGGGGG
